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  The Constitutional Court has determined that the crime of adultery was consistent 
with the constitution for four times. Concerning the crime of sexual intercourse 
under pretence of marriage, the Court changed its prior position and invalidated 
the statute. Self determination of sexual intercourse not only lies within the 
private sphere of an individual’s privacy, but it is also intertwined with the social 
culture of a community where the individual belong to. Hence, it lies within the 
grey area where personal values conflict with community values. Despite numerous 
constitutional decisions, the concept of self determination of sexual intercourse, 
and its protected scope have not been clearly defined. I would like to propose the 
following conclusion on the constitutional decision of the self determination of 
sexual intercourse
  First, there is no need to recognize the self determination of sexual intercourse 
as one of Constitutional Law's basic natural rights. The right to engage in a 
sexual relationship and to choose one’s own partner is already included in article 
17 of the Constitution protecting one’s freedom of privacy. 
  Second, the principle of balancing test is to be applied when deciding the 
standard of the constitutional review of the self determination of sexual intercourse, 
yet since the specifics of the evaluation is directly relevant to the individual's 
essentially protected freedom, applying at the same time a strict scrutiny of 
proportionality.
  Third, even if a strict proportional judgment were said to be applied regarding 
the self determination of sexual intercourse relevant to the adultery act, this does 
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not immediately result to the unconstitutionality of the relevant act. However, in 
light of the changing legal reality concerning the self determination of sexual 
intercourse, it is most appropriate to abolish the adultery act.
  Fourth, even if the adultery act were to be abolished, and the crime of sexual 
intercourse under the pretense of marriage were to be invalidated, this would not 
mean that both acts are to be ethically nor legally permitted.
Keyword: self determination of sexual intercourse, crime of adultery, crime of 
sexual intercourse under pretence of marriage, freedom of privacy, 
principle of balancing test, strict scrutiny of proportionality
1. Introduction
  The Constitutional Court, established in accordance with the amended 1987 
Constitution, has recognized the binding nature of the Constitution through various 
decisions for the past 24 years. It has also acknowledged the right of self 
determination of sexual intercourse as a fundamental right under the constitution, 
thereby making meaningful determinations concerning the constitutionality of 
statutes which restrict it. The Constitutional Court has determined that the crime 
of adultery was consistent with the constitution for four times. Concerning the 
crime of sexual intercourse under pretence of marriage, the Court changed its 
prior position and invalidated the statute. The decision concerning adultery is the 
only crime whereby constitutionality is decided for four times, and in fact the 
constitutionality issue has reached the Court through various channels, such as the 
application from the related party, the request from another court, judiciary 
unilateral request, and the party’s constitutional complaint following the denial of 
request by a court. This represents a lack of social consensus for constitutional 
interpretation, alteration and abolition with regard to adultery. 
  Self determination of sexual intercourse not only lies within the private sphere 
of an individual’s privacy, but it is also intertwined with the social culture of a 
community where the individual belong to. Hence, it lies within the grey area 
where personal values conflict with community values. Despite numerous constitutional 
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decisions, the concept of self determination of sexual intercourse, and its protected 
scope have not been clearly defined. Moreover, whether any realistic enforcement 
measure exists is unclear. The means and limitations for any governmental 
enforcement policy remain controversial. In addition to that, some people confuse 
the constitutional review standards with the legislative policy issues concerning the 
crime of adultery and sexual intercourse under pretence of marriage. Such 
misunderstandings happen because some are unable to differentiate a legal 
provision which is unconstitutional, from a provision which is constitutional but is 
one which should be abolished. Such position is unable to distinguish a norm of 
act and a norm of control during the interpretation of the Constitution, thereby 
failing to precisely understand the legal nature of the Constitutional provision.
  This article tries to suggest the appropriate constitutional review standard 
through an analysis of constitutional issues related to the right of self determination 
of sexual intercourse by reviewing the Constitutional Court’s decisions related to 
adultery and sexual intercourse under pretence of marriage. Self determination of 
sexual intercourse is also related to abortion, and this issue is connected to a 
woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy and the fetus’s right to life. However, 
our object for analysis shall be limited to adultery and sexual intercourse under 
pretence of marriage.
2. A Summary on the Constitutional Decisions
A. The Crime for Adultery
  (1) 1990. 9. 10. 89 hunma 82 (1st case : constitutional)
  The majority opinion (6 judges) of the Constitutional Court concluded that the 
crime for adultery was constitutional. 2 dissenting opinions (Judges, Han Byeong 
Chae and Lee Si Yoon) acknowledged the constitutionality of the crime for 
adultery, but decided that the criminal statute was unconstitutional because the 
statute only prescribed imprisonment without any lesser penalty, thus violating the 
principle of balancing test. 1 dissenting opinion (Judge, Kim Yang Kyun) 
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concluded that the crime for adultery itself was unconstitutional because it 
infringed upon the right to privacy, thus violating the principle of balancing test. 
Even if the statute can be considered constitutional, the fact that the statute only 
prescribes imprisonment for less than 2 years is a violation of the principle of 
balancing test. 
  (2) 1993. 3. 11. 90 hunka 70 (2nd case : constitutional)
  This decision repeated the 1st decision, thereby determining that the crime for 
adultery constitutional. A newly appointed judge (Judge, Hwang Do Yeon) agreed 
with the majority opinion, and since there were no changes with the composition 
of judges, there was no separate voting on the issue. 
  (3) 2001. 10. 25. 2000 hunba 60 (3rd case : constitutional)
  The majority opinion (8 judges) of this decision determined that the crime for 
adultery was constitutional, and requested the need for a serious approach for the 
abolition of crime for adultery. Meanwhile, one dissenting opinion (Judge, Kwon 
Seong) considered that the crime for adultery as unconstitutional since it deprived 
the right of self determination of sexual intercourse derived from article 10 of the 
Constitution.
  (4) 2008. 10. 10. 30. 2007 hunka 17․21, 2008 hunka 7․26, 2008 hunka 21․
47 (4th case : constitutional)
  The majority opinion of this decision (4 judges) determined that the crime for 
adultery was constitutional. Among the majority opinion, a judge (Judge, Min 
Hyeong Ki) pointed out the problems of adultery and requested further efforts to 
make legislative improvements. Meanwhile, in the dissenting opinion, 3 judges 
(Judges, Kim Jong Dae, Lee Dong Hup and Mok Young Jun) held that the crime 
for adultery violated the principle of balancing test, and that the crime infringed 
upon the right of privacy and self-determination of sexual intercourse. A judge 
(Judge, Song Doo Hwan) decided that the crime for adultery in itself was 
constitutional, but the statute violated the balancing test between responsibility and 
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punishment by only prescribing imprisonment as the penalty, therefore making the 
law unconstitutional. Meanwhile, one dissenting opinion (by Judge Kim Hee Ok) 
determined that the statute was inconsistent with the Constitution because it 
violated the principle of balancing test by punishing both constitutional adulterous 
acts and unconstitutional adulterous acts. However, due to the need to punish 
unconstitutional adulterous acts, the judged decided to apply the statute provisionally. 
B. The Crime of Sexual Intercourse under Pretence of Marriage 
  (1) 2002. 10. 31. 99 hunba 40, 2002 hunba 50 (1st case : constitutional)
  The majority opinion (7 judges) determined that the crime of sexual intercourse 
under pretence of marriage was consistent with the Constitution, and noted that a 
serious approach was needed to decide whether the law should remain effective. 
Meanwhile, the dissenting opinion by two judges (Judges, Kwon Seong and Joo 
Seon Hye) decided that the crime of sexual intercourse under pretence of marriage 
violated the principle of balancing test. It impaired human dignity and infringed 
upon the right to pursue happiness protected under article 10 of the Constitution, 
thereby making the statute unconstitutional. 
  (2) 2009. 11. 26. 2008 hunba 58, 2009 hunba 191 (2nd case : unconstitutional)
  The majority opinion (6 judges) adjudicated that the crime of sexual intercourse 
under pretence of marriage was unconstitutional because it violated the principle 
of balancing test with the infringement on men’s right of self-determination of 
sexual intercourse and the right to privacy. Meanwhile, the dissenting opinion 
by three judges (Judges, Lee Kang Kuk, Jo Dae Hyeon and Song Doo Hwan) 
determined that the crime of sexual intercourse under pretence of marriage was 
constitutional, since the statute only penalizes acts beyond the internal limit of 
men’s self-determination of sexual intercourse and the right to privacy under 
Article 17 of the Constitution. Therefore, it was decided that the statute was 
consistent with the Constitution since it did not impair fundamental rights. 
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3. Analysis and Evaluation
A. The Crime for Adultery
  (1) Provision at Issue
  With regard to the crime for adultery, the provision at issue is article 241 of 
Criminal Act which states that, “(1) A married person who commits adultery shall 
be punished by imprisonment for not more than two years. The same shall apply 
to the other participant. (2) The crime in the preceding paragraph shall be 
prosecuted only upon the complaint of the victimized spouse. If the victimized 
spouse condones or pardons the adultery, complaint can no longer be made.” 
  (2) The Standard of Unconstitutionality for Constitutional Provisions
  A constitutional judgment is a judicial function which confirms a specific 
provision of a statute, and determines whether that particular provision violates the 
Constitution. During the constitutional judgment on the crime for adultery, the 
related articles of the Constitution must be specified since the judgment is a 
constitutional review for the provision at issue, which is article 241 of the 
Criminal Act. The Constitutional Court referred to Article 10 (human worth and 
dignity, and right to pursue happiness), Article 36 paragraph 1 (marriage and 
family institution), Article 11 paragraph 1 (right to equality), Article 17 (right to 
privacy), Paragraph 2 of Article 37 (principle of balancing test) as the related 
articles. Meanwhile, the court which requested the Constitutional Court for judicial 
review or the parties who filed the complaint argued that article 241 of the 
Criminal Act infringed the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution.
  The Constitutional Court performs its judicial review not only from the legal 
point of view suggested by the subsidiary court which requested the constitutional 
review or the party who made such application, it also takes into consideration all 
the legal effect seen from the overall constitutional point of view.1) The 
Constitutional provisions pointed out by the Constitutional Court are based on the 
1) Constitutional decision 98 Hunka 16, April 27, 2000.
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self-determination of sexual intercourse. Therefore, the constitutional review for the 
crime of adultery is a review to decide whether article 241 of the Criminal Act 
limits the self-determination of sexual intercourse and whether such limitation is 
constitutionally justified. 
  (3) The Legal Nature of the Right of Self Determination of Sexual Intercourse
  The Constitutional Court, in its previous 1st, 2nd and 3rd decisions, pointed out 
that the fundamental right limited by article 241 of the Criminal Act, namely the 
self-determination of sexual intercourse was derived from article 10 of the Constitution. 
The Court also defined self-determination of sexual intercourse as a right to have 
sexual intercourse and a right to choose his or her partner. Namely, the majority 
opinion and the dissenting opinion both acknowledged that “Article 10 of the 
Constitution guarantees the right to protect individual personality and the right to 
pursue happiness, which are the essence of the human and individual values. The 
premise of the right to protect individual personality and the right to pursue 
happiness is the individual right to choose one’s destiny, and this right includes 
the right to determine whether to engage in sexual intercourse, and the partner the 
individual chooses to engage the sexual activities with. It is clear that the crime 
of adultery limits an individual’s right of self-determination of sexual intercourse.” 
According to this, the act of adultery lies within the boundary of self-determination 
of sexual intercourse which is derived from article 10 of the Constitution. 
Therefore, the standard for the constitutionality test is article 10 of the 
Constitution.
  On the other hand, both the majority and the dissenting opinion in the 4th 
decision pointed out that not only the right of self determination of sexual 
intercourse under article 10 was limited by the statute, but the right to privacy 
under article 17 was seen as a relevant fundamental right. In the dissenting 
opinion of the 1st decision, Judge Kim Yang Gyun hold that the crime of 
adultery was unconstitutional, since it infringed upon the right to conceal one’s 
private life or it violated the principle of balancing test. The right to conceal 
one’s private life was interpreted to be a part of the right to privacy under article 
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17 of the Constitution. Thus, the Constitutional Court stated that the crime for 
adultery under article 241 of the Criminal Act was based on the moral value 
evaluation within an individual’s private sphere, and that such evaluation lies 
within the protected realms of self-determination of sexual intercourse, and that 
such right can be seen as an independent fundamental right deduced from article 
10 of the Constitution. In particular, the 4th
 
decision distinguished the right to 
privacy under article 17 from the right of self-determination of sexual intercourse 
under article 10 of the Constitution. The act of adultery was seen as closely 
related to both of these two rights. 
  (4) The Standard of Constitutionality Test and it Determination
  It is pivotal for the Court to confirm the notion of fundamental right and its 
protected scope since the standard of constitutionality test differs for different 
types of fundamental right.2) During the 1st, 2nd and 3rd decision, the Constitutional 
Court recognized an independent fundamental right of self determination of sexual 
intercourse under article 10, and it applied the same standard of constitutionality 
test for the personal right and the right to pursue happiness. The majority opinion 
of the 4th decision stated that the rights under article 10 and 17 were limited by 
the provision at issue, but made its decision based on a singular standard of 
constitutionality test. The dissenting opinion suggested using a strict scrutiny test 
of proportionality, and used such test on all the fundamental rights in the issue. 
  The Constitutional Court applied the principle of balancing test under article 37 
paragraph 2 as a standard to test the constitutionality of the crime for adultery. 
The majority opinion declaring it as constitutional stated that the legislative 
purpose was justifiable because it protected good sexual morality, monogamous 
marriage, sexual sincerity between husband and wife, prevented social harm by 
such crime, sexual fidelity between a husband and a wife, prevented socially evil 
influence due to adultery, and maintained marriage and family based on individual 
2) Kim Kyong-Je, “The Constitutional Problems of Deciding the Constitutionality of 
Punishing the Crime for Adultery”, Constitutional Study Research, vol. 15, no. 2, 
2009, pp.141-143.
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dignity and gender equality. On the appropriateness of the measure, it was decided 
that criminal penalty under the law was appropriate to achieve the legislative 
purpose. On the matter of minimizing the infringement of rights, the Court came 
to a conclusion that the concrete content of criminal penalty was within the 
legislative discretion, and that fundamental rights were not excessively violated 
since adulterous acts impair social order, and because the law was modified so as 
to prevent abuse of the legal system. In addition, the Court acknowledged that the 
law was able to sought a balance between legal interests, that is, while private 
legal interest was only slightly limited since article 241 of the Criminal Act did 
not penalize psychological interactions through sexual activities between special 
relations or accidental sexual conduct, the public legal interest to protect healthy 
sexual morality and to sustain marriage and family was substantially protected. 
  Meanwhile, the dissenting opinion which determined the crime for adultery as 
unconstitutional applied the same principle of balancing test, just like the majority 
opinion. The dissenting opinion recognized the legislative purpose of article 241 of 
the Criminal Act, but stated that the concept of sex amongst the citizens has 
changed significantly, and that the appropriateness, effectiveness and the preventive 
nature of the law no longer existed. On the contrary, the law could be abused. 
Therefore, it was decided that article 241 of the Criminal Act did not meet the 
criteria of appropriateness, effectiveness and minimum infringement. The dissenting 
opinion also refused to acknowledge the balance of interest since the provision 
infringed upon individual basic rights and the rights of their children. The 
dissenting opinion in the 4th decision, while applying the principle of balancing 
test, used the strict scrutiny of proportionality test. On the other hand, the opinion 
which decided that the law was incompatibility with the Constitution but accepted 
the provisional application of the law also used the principle of balancing test. 
This position noted that the form of adultery was very diverse, including both 
constitutional and unconstitutional ones. However, the fact that the criminal code 
uniformly punished adulterous activities without any differentiation was the reason 
why the law was seen unconstitutional. In other words, adulterous activities could 
be diverse according to intent and the family situation of the actor, the other 
228   서울대학교 法學 제53권 제2호 (2012. 6.)
participant, the frequency and the manner in which the act was conducted and etc. 
Such diverse categories of adulterous activities differed in illegality. However, if 
the crime for adultery was nullified, then the constitutional punishment illegal 
adulterous acts could not be enforced, and hence, the law was to be provisionally 
applied until a new law was enacted. 
  The Constitutional Court mentioned that the principle of balancing test was not 
to be applied in the same manner in all the individual fundamental rights. It 
stated that the standard for determining the constitutionality should be different in 
accordance with the nature of each individual fundamental right. In other words, if 
a certain law restricted the fundamental scope of an individual’s personal freedom, 
strict scrutiny would apply. However, if the law had larger social relevance, 
rational scrutiny would apply.3) Judging from this statement, the application of 
strict scrutiny when deciding that the unconstitutionality of the crime for adultery 
shows that an adulterous act falls within an individual’s fundamental scope of 
freedom. To apply strict scrutiny of proportionality test just because “the law 
limits the a person’s self determination of sexual intercourse and the right to 
privacy” does not sound persuasive. 
B. The Crime of Sexual Intercourse under Pretence of Marriage
  (1) Provision at issue
  Article 304 of Criminal Act states that “A person who induces a female not 
habitually immoral to engage in sexual intercourse under pretence of marriage or 
through other fraudulent means, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more 
than two years or by a fine not exceeding five million won.” The accused fact 
applied to the complainants is “sexual intercourse under pretence of marriage”. 
Thus, the provision at issue is “A person who induces a female not habitually 
immoral to engage in sexual intercourse under pretence of marriage” part, 
excluding the part of “through other fraudulent means.” 
3) Constitutional decision 89 Hunma 214, December 24, 1998; Constitutional decision 99 
Hunba 76, October 31, 2002; Constitutional decision 2001 Hunba 71 February 24, 
2005.
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  (2) The Standard of Unconstitutionality for Constitutional Provisions
  The Constitutional Court, similar to the adultery decisions, referred Article 10 
(human worth and dignity, and right to pursue happiness), Article 36 paragraph 1 
(Marriage and family institution), Article 11 paragraph 1 (right to equality), 
Article 17 (right to privacy), Paragraph 2 of Article 37 (principle of balancing 
test) as the related articles. The constitutionality test concerning this crime is a 
decision on whether article 304 of the Criminal Act limits a man’s self-determination 
of sexual intercourse and whether such limitation could be justified under the 
Constitution.
  (3) The Legal Status of “Self Determination of Sexual Intercourse”
  The Constitutional Court, in the 1st case deciding that the statute was constitutional, 
defined “self-determination of sexual intercourse” as the right to choose the other 
partner and to enter into a sexual relationship responsibly, following one’s own 
sexual determination within his or her privacy, which is a sexual concept formed 
independently by an individual within the society based on one’s own choice of 
lifestyle. “Such right is included under article 10 of the Constitution which protects 
personal rights and the right to pursue happiness, and article 17 of the Constitution 
which protects the freedom to privacy. Moreover, the crime of sexual intercourse 
under pretence of marriage not only limits men’s self determination of sexual 
intercourse, it also infringes upon women’s self-determination of sexual intercourse. 
Therefore, the law is not inconsistent with the principle of balancing test, since it 
infringes upon men’s self determination of sexual intercourse to a minimum level, 
instead of the fundamental part. Therefore, it was determined that the law was not 
infringing upon the right to pursue happiness and the freedom to privacy. On the 
other hand, one dissenting opinion (Judge, Kwon Seong) stated that the right 
limited in the case was the self determination of sexual intercourse, and determined 
that the law violated article 10 of the Constitutional protecting the right to pursue 
happiness because it violated the principle of balancing test. One dissenting 
opinion (Judge, Joo Seon Hye) stated that “the self determination of sexual 
intercourse is part of personal rights, and personal rights is a foundation for both 
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the right to pursue happiness and the protection of human dignity under article 10 
of the Constitution, as well as the right to privacy protected under article 17 of 
the Constitution… self determination of sexual intercourse is the right to engage 
in a sexual relationship responsibly under according to one’s own decision.” 
  During the 2nd case where the law was seen unconstitutional, the majority 
opinion decided that the crime of sexual intercourse under pretense of marriage 
limited several fundamental rights : “the premise of personal rights and the right 
to pursue happiness is the right for an individual to choose one’s own fate or 
destiny, and the right to choose one’s own destiny includes self determination of 
sexual intercourse, including the decision whether to engage in a sexual relationship, 
and with whom he or she choose to have the relationship with. The provision at 
hand undoubtedly limits a man’s self determination of sexual intercourse, and it 
also infringes upon the privacy of and individual, thereby violating article 17 of 
the Constitution.” On the other hand, 3 dissenting opinions (Judges, Lee Kang 
Kuk, Jo Dae Hyun and Song Doo Hwan) decided that “the sexual relationship 
between a man and a woman is protected under article 17 of the Constitution 
since it deals with the private life of an individual’s life… The sexual relationship 
of a man and a woman is within the protected area if the man loves his partner. 
However, the act of having a sexual relationship under the pretense of marriage is 
an act no longer confined to oneself, but is an act that violates the legal interest 
of another individual. Hence, the latter act clearly deviates from the inner 
boundary of the right of self determination of sexual intercourse.”
  Although the judges of the Constitutional Court stated that the crime of sexual 
intercourse under pretense of marriage limited the right of self determination of 
sexual intercourse, they have different opinions concerning the legal meaning of 
self determination of sexual intercourse. The majority opinion in the first and 
second decisions understood self determination of sexual intercourse as being 
included within article 10 and 17 of the Constitution. The dissenting opinion 
during the first decision (Judge, Joo Seon Hye) recognized self determination of 
sexual intercourse as party of personal rights, and finds its source from article 10 
and article 17 of the Constitution. On the other hand, the one dissenting opinion 
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during the first decision (Judge, Kwon Seong) decided that the foundation of self 
determination of sexual intercourse was article 10, while 3 dissenting opinions 
(Judges, Lee Kang Kuk, Jo Dae Hyun and Song Doo Hwan) determined that 
article 17 of the Constitution gave rise to self determination of sexual intercourse. 
  (4) The Standard of Constitutionality Test and it Determination
  During the first decision, the majority opinion decided that the means to punish 
crime of sexual intercourse under pretense of marriage was under the discretion of 
the legislative body. Therefore, it was determined that the law was constitutional 
since it passes the principle of balancing test under article 37 paragraph 2 of the 
Constitution. However, the court took the a careful approach when deciding 
whether crime of sexual intercourse under pretense of marriage should be maintained 
by taking into account foreign legislation, and the effectiveness, side effects and 
the supplementary nature of the provision. The dissenting opinion also used the 
principle of balancing test. One dissenting opinion (Judge, Joo Seon Hye) stated 
that the principle of balancing test should be applied in a stricter manner when 
deciding the need to use criminal punishment in the private life of an individual.  
This dissenting opinion concluded that the objective of the law itself was not 
justifiable. On the other hand, the majority opinion of the second decision used 
the principle of balancing test when deciding the constitutionality of the law. It 
was noted that the limitation on self determination of sexual intercourse must be 
followed by a strict scrutiny of proportionality. When looking into the elements 
for justification, the majority opinion did not look into individual fundamental 
right, but considered all the fundamental rights at the same time. In other words, 
it changed its previous decision, determining that the law was unconstitutional 
since it lacked all the necessary elements, namely the justifiability of the purpose, 
appropriateness of the means, minimum infringement and the balance of legal 
interests. However, the dissenting opinion, while using the same principle of 
balancing test, came to a different conclusion. 
  During the judicial review of the crime of sexual intercourse under pretense of 
marriage, the principle of balancing test was applied. The majority opinion of the 
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second decision adopted the strict scrutiny test of proportionality used by the 
dissenting opinion during the 1st decision (Judge, Joo Seon Hye), thus changing 
its position and announcing that the law was unconstitutional. Similar to the crime 
for adultery, the crime of sexual intercourse under pretense of marriage infringes 
upon an individual’s fundamental freedom. Hence, a strict scrutiny test of 
proportionality test was used. Furthermore, similar to the crime for adultery, the 
Constitutional Court stated that the rights limited in the case were the ones 
protected under articles 10 and 17 of the Constitution, and it applied the same test 
to determine the law’s constitutionality.  
C. Constitutional Contentious Issues
  (1) The Fundamental Right Nature of Self Determination of Sexual Intercourse
  Through the judicial review of the crime for adultery and the crime of sexual 
intercourse under pretense of marriage, the Constitutional Court has recognized 
self determination of sexual intercourse as an independent fundamental right. 
However, the judges had different opinions as to the concept, legal nature and 
constitutional sources of such right. In other words, while an act of adultery and 
an act of sexual intercourse under pretense of marriage are recognized as being 
included within the protected area of self determination of sexual intercourse, 
opinions about the constitutional sources differ, including (1) personal rights and 
the right to pursue happiness under article 10, (2) both articles 10 and 17 of the 
Constitution (this position is again divided into two, including one that incorporates 
both articles 10 and 17, and one which sees an independent fundamental right 
from article 17), and (3) article 17 of the Constitution. 
  The crime for adultery under article 241 and the crime of sexual intercourse 
under pretense of marriage under article 304 of the Criminal Act are related to 
the moral value built on the foundation of individual personality. Thus, they are 
intertwined with the personal rights and the right to pursue happiness under article 
10 of the Constitution. However, when considering the constitutionality of the 
provision on a concrete level, such as taking into account the structure and the 
conflict of the fundamental rights, it is more reasonable to include the act of 
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adultery and the act of sexual intercourse under pretense of marriage into the 
protection provided by article 17, namely the right and freedom to privacy.4)   
Both actions are not only closely related to article 17, the constitutional review 
standard is also the same as the one used by article 10. Therefore, there is no 
need to use article 10, which is a supplementary provision in nature.5) The 
Constitutional Court also stated that “the right to pursue happiness is supplementary 
in nature, and thus, as long as the right to be a civil servant exists and a 
determination on whether such right has been infringed takes place, there is no 
need to independently determine whether the right to pursue happiness has been 
infringed.”6) Therefore, it would be sufficient to determine whether article 17 has 
been violated when determining the constitutionality of the act of adultery and the 
act of sexual intercourse under pretense of marriage. Even when self-determination 
of sexual intercourse other than adultery and sexual intercourse under pretense of 
marriage should be recognized, it is reasonable to include the protective area 
outside article 17 (right and freedom to privacy) under the protection given by 
article 10 (personal rights and the right to pursue happiness). 
  (2) Evaluation on Whether Self Determination of Sexual Intercourse has been 
infringed
  During the judicial review of self-determination of sexual intercourse, the 
principle of balancing test was used to determine whether self-determination of 
sexual intercourse has been violated. The constitutional basis for the position 
4) Lee Hee-Hoon, “A Constitutional Consideration of the Crime for Adultery and the 
Crime for Rape : Surrounding the Issue of the Violation of Self Determination of 
Sexual Intercourse”, Jungang Law Journal, vol. 13, no. 3, 2011, pp.59-60; Kim 
Il-Hwan, “A Critical Review on the Constitutional Grounds of the Self Determination 
of Sexual Intercourse”, Constitutional Law Research, vol. 12, no. 2, 2006, p.136; Kim 
Myung-Sik, “A Reconsideration on the Constitutional Grounds of the Self 
Determination of Sexual Intercourse”, Sungkyunkwan Law Review, vol. 15, no. 2, 2003, 
p.35; Kwon Hyung-Joon, “An Analysis on the Constitutional Cases Relating to the 
Self Determination of Sexual Intercourse”, Law Review, vol. 17, 2000, p.19.
5) Kim Kyong-Je, supra note 2, p.140.
6) Constitutional decision 99 Hunma 112, December 14, 2000.
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stating that punishment on both crimes is unconstitutional is as follow : 
  First, the issue of self-determination of sexual intercourse is related to personal 
morality and ethics.7) As such, states should not be allowed to intervene in such 
matters. Concerning adultery or sexual intercourse under pretense of marriage, social 
criticism and sanctions which are based on morality and ethics is sufficiently 
enough, and there should not be any punishment by the government. In particular, 
the crime of sexual intercourse under pretense of marriage denies women’s ability 
to determine their own sexual lives responsibly, and the requirement of “habitual 
offence” reflects a patriarchal ideology.8) However, whether an act should be dealt 
within the realms of morality and ethics, or whether it should be regulated by 
criminal penalty is an issue determined by the time, place, people’s mentality and 
the relationship between citizen, society and the country. Furthermore, it is practically 
impossible to differentiate a legal question with a question related to ethics. A 
societal institution based on morality and ethics could also be elevated to a legal 
one. Therefore, the proposed argument here is not convincing enough to claim 
that the crime for adultery and the crime of sexual intercourse under pretense of 
marriage limiting self-determination of sexual intercourse as unconstitutional.9)  
However, the “habitual offense” as a requirement for the crime of sexual intercourse 
under pretense of marriage is not only vague, but is also unrelated to the 
limitation of self-determination of sexual intercourse. Thus, the act does not justify 
the legislative purpose, nor does it satisfy the appropriateness of means.10)  
  Second, even assuming that self-determination of sexual intercourse should be a 
 7) Lee Hee-Hoon, supra note 4, p.68; Jun Kwang-Suk, Constitutional Case Research 
(Beopmunsa, 2000), p.226; Lee Jun-Il, “Constitutional Justice and the Crime for 
Adultery”, Human Rights and Justice, vol. 353, 2006, pp.143-144; Lee Joo-Hee, 
“Criminal Punishment of the Crime for Adultery and the Constitutional Justification”, 
Law and Policy Research, vol. 8, no. 2, 2008, p.337; Cho Kuk, “The 
Unconstitutionality of the Crime of Sexual Intercourse under Pretence of Marriage”, 
Criminal Law Research, vol. 21, no. 3, 2009, pp.259-260.
 8) Cho Kuk, supra note 7, pp.259-260.
 9) Song Ki-Chun and Lee Jung-Won, “A Constitutional and Criminal Consideration 
concerning the Abolishment of the Crime for Adultery”, Constitutional Law Review, 
vol. 10, no. 2, 2004, p.354.
10) Cho Kuk, supra note 7, p.263.
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legal question, the exercise of self-determination of sexual intercourse lies within 
the boundary of private contracts. Thus, legal sanctions according civil law would 
be sufficient, while criminal law should not intervene in these kinds of issues. In 
other words, the premise of recognizing an adulterous act is the sexual fidelity 
between a husband and a wife, and adultery is merely a breach of obligation 
within the marriage contract, while criminal punishment is not needed for an act 
of sexual intercourse under pretense of marriage because social harm is not 
accompanied when a woman is seduced.11) Breach of sexual fidelity within the 
private contract of marriage is the fundamental matter in adulterous cases since 
the institution of marriage and family were established on a foundation of equality 
between men and women during the enactment of the criminal act.12) Whether an 
action constitutes a violation of rights, and therefore needs to be dealt with civil 
action, or whether that particular action constitutes a violation of a social system, 
and therefore needs to be met with criminal punishment, is in principle within the 
legislative discretion.13) Such discretion is not unlimited, and it must abide by the 
principle of proportionality or the principle of balance test, taking into account the 
crime and the protected rights.14) However, the principle of balance test is not 
applied since the determination of the use of civil or criminal sanctions is 
deferred to the legislative branch.15) Therefore, this argument is not sufficient to 
prove the unconstitutionality of the act, but the determination of constitutionality, 
particularly concerning the crime for adultery and the crime of sexual intercourse 
under pretense of marriage, can be done by applying the principle of balance test, 
taking into account the protected rights, legislative purpose and means, balance of 
legal interest and etc.16)  
11) Heo Tae-Il, “The Unconstitutionality of the Crime for Adultery”, Justice, vol. 104, 
2008, p.130; Lee Hee-Hoon, supra note 4, p.69; Jun Kwang-Suk, supra note 7, pp. 
230-231; Lee Joo-Hee, supra note 7, pp.338-339.
12) Lee Joo-Hee, supra note 7, p.342.
13) Constitutional decision 91Hunba11, April 20, 1995.
14) Heo Tae-Il, supra note 11, pp.127-129.
15) Chung Jung-Sup, The Principles of Constitutional Studies (Parkyoungsa, 2011), pp. 
379-380.
16) Some claim that the constitutional court’s judgment holding that both the crime for 
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  Third, it is stated that the specific content and meaning of self-determination of 
sexual intercourse could not be the standard to decide the constitutionality of the 
criminal punishment. This is because there has been a significant change in the 
society compared to the time when the law was enacted. According to this 
opinion, the act only received one half of votes in the legislative branch, barely 
passing the limit, showing the lack of consensus.17) Furthermore, the Ministry of 
Justice Criminal Act Amendment Committee has also in the past decided to 
abolish crime for adultery. All of the above show that the opinions concerning 
sexual activities have changed. Thus the said criminal punishments are no longer 
effective to protect marriage and family. The acts overly suppress the self 
determination of sexual intercourse, and bring side effects related to the abuse of 
the law.18) The legal effect and the effectiveness of the said act are also a matter 
of dispute even within the judges of the Constitutional Court, and such differences 
are linked with the content of the principle of balancing test, namely, appropriateness 
of measures, minimized infringement, balancing of interest.
  Fourth, it is said that the constitutionality review concerning self-determination 
of sexual intercourse should apply strict scrutiny of proportionality. In the 1st 
decision of sexual intercourse under pretence of marriage, the dissenting opinion 
(Judge, Joo Seon Hye) commented that “when a law infringes upon one’s sexual 
life, which is considered a matter of fundamental privacy, the legislator has the 
burden of proof to persuade the Constitutional Court on matters such as the 
presence of concrete danger or public interest which became the legislative motive 
of the particular act, and the concrete causal link between the act and achieving 
adultery and the crime of sexual intercourse under pretence of marriage are constitutional 
is a result of the court’s wrong decision to adopt judicial restraint, when it should 
have adopted judicial activism for the protection of fundamental rights of the citizens 
in a pluralistic society (Lee Dong Hoon, “The Constitutional Appeal of the Self 
Determination of Sexual Intercourse : The Appeal to Declare Article 304 of the 
Criminal Act Unconstitutional”, Comparative Legal Research, vol. 2, 2003, pp.219-223).
17) The history, legislative process, legal comparative consideration concerning the crime 
for adultery can be found in Heo Tae-Il, supra note 11, pp.121-125; Song Ki-Chun 
and Lee Jung-Won, supra note 9, pp.335-346.
18) Lee Hee-Hoon, supra note 4, pp.69-70; Cho Kuk, supra note 7, pp.254-255.
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the legislative purpose. The act needs to be reconsidered because it lacks careful 
consideration about the characteristics of the regulated life sphere, and it 
oversimplifies the problem by giving a huge discretion to the legislator on matters 
concerning the punishment of sexual activities conducted by an individual.” This 
position was reflected in the majority opinion of the 2nd decision. On the other 
hand, while the dissenting opinion in the 4th adultery decision stated that “the 
limitation on the right of self-determination of sexual intercourse and the right to 
privacy should be reviewed using a strict scrutiny since these rights are fundamental 
rights recognized by the Constitution”, the majority opinion recognized the legislative 
discretion, relied on the principle of balancing test, and concluded that the provision 
was constitutional. Such differences make a significant impact during judicial 
review because it affects the burden of proof. In particular, if legislative discretion 
is recognized, the complainant has to prove that the unconstitutionality of the 
provision. However, if strict scrutiny is applied, the legislator has the burden of 
proof.19) 
  (3) An assessment of the Abolition Issue of the Adultery Law
  Considering that the Constitutional Court’s function is to review the constitutionality 
of an act and not to propose the best interpretation of it, in case that one fails to 
prove that a certain provision is unconstitutional, the Constitutional Court cannot 
decide upon the constitutionality of the said provision. Therefore, even if the 
Constitutional Court has had proclaimed that adultery is perfectly constitutional, 
this decision simply reassures that adultery does not violate the Constitutional 
Law. Accordingly, the Court’s decision does not bind the legislators and thus the 
National Assembly can still repeal the law at any time. However, in case that the 
19) The standard of review for the principle of balancing test is as follow : when an act 
limits the fundamental freedom of an individual, the legislator has to prove the 
concrete causal link between the act and achieving the legislative purpose. However, 
when an act only limits the economic activities concerning the social relations with 
others, the legislator is given wide discretion, and therefore a lenient standard of 
review, namely “tangible limitation” is applied (Constitutional decision 99 Hunba 76, 
October 31, 2002). 
238   서울대학교 法學 제53권 제2호 (2012. 6.)
punishment of adultery were to be unconstitutional, in accordance with the general 
effect of the Constitutional Court, the relevant provision on adultery is to be duly 
repealed, hence providing a meaningful evaluation to the issue of the adultery 
especially when punishing for adultery is still constitutional in the eyes of the 
Court.20) 
  The core reason for the abolition of adultery lies on the fact that the act lacks 
in regulatory power and effectiveness due to its failure to apply the regulation in 
par with the legal reality. Taking into account that back in the days when adultery 
was newly enacted, feudalistic traditions such as concubinage still existed. Thus, it 
was necessary to establish a family system within the community by punishing the 
parties involved in adultery. However, it should be noted that nowadays it is 
considered that the normative function of the adultery act is failing due to a sharp 
increase in divorce rate, changes in the court’s view of sexuality, distinct standing 
of the female status, monogamy in the family system, compensation in the process 
of divorcing and others. Moreover, it is claimed that the relevant act overly 
restricts the individuals’ self determination of sexual intercourse and thus brings 
about societal side effects in the application of the law.21) 
  In fact, although the majority opinion in the Constitutional Court has supported 
the constitutionality of adultery, they have shown to consent to the complete abolition 
of the act. The Court have ruled on the premise that one, it is unconstitutional to 
punish adultery that is only limited to jail time and two, that the presence of 
certain disagreements in the Court’s final opinion reveal that all adultery acts are 
unconstitutional. The Court has decided on the first three cases regarding the 
adultery act itself that it was constitutional (8 : 1) just as in the fourth decision (6 
: 3). However, setting aside the issue of the constitutionality of adultery, the Court 
has indirectly assured that it would be most appropriate to abolish the relevant 
law by requesting legislative efforts to review on whether the abolition of the 
20) The introduction relating to the maintenance and abolition of the crime for adultery 
in Lee Joo-Hee, supra note 7, pp.336-339; Song Ki-Chun and Lee Jung-Won, supra 
note 9, pp.353-362.
21) Lee Joo-Hee, supra note 7, pp.344-345; Song Ki-Chun and Lee Jung-Won, supra note 
9, pp.360-362.
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adultery provision is consistent with today’s sexual activities and legal awareness 
and implementation. With this in light, it seems that with the ongoing changes in 
the interpretation of the Constitution’s value and reality, the issue regarding the 
abolition of the adultery act will continue in the long run, and hence in light of 
today’s legal reality, it seems to be most appropriate to abolish the adultery law 
even if the Constitutional Court have ruled it otherwise.22) 
4. Conclusion
  Although the Constitutional Court have judged on the self determination of 
sexual intercourse during their review regarding the unconstitutionality of the 
adultery and the crime of sexual intercourse under the pretense of marriage, the 
Court has failed to clarify on the definition, character and the standard of what 
constitutes the self determination of sexual intercourse. As for the crime of sexual 
intercourse under the pretense of marriage, the court ruled that it was constitutional 
back in 2002, and soon switched its opinion and ruled it unconstitutional in 2009, 
preluding the abolition of the relevant law after 56 years of the legislation. I 
would like to propose the following conclusion on the constitutional decision of 
the self determination of sexual intercourse
  First, there is no need to recognize the self determination of sexual intercourse 
as one of Constitutional Law’s basic natural rights. The right to engage in a sexual 
relationship and to choose one’s own partner is already included in article 17 of 
the Constitution protecting one’s freedom of privacy. Moreover, in case that a part 
of the self determination of sexual intercourse were not to be protected by article 
17, it is still possible to be protected by article 10 of the Constitutional Law of 
human dignity and the right to pursue happiness. 
  Second, the principle of balancing test is to be applied when deciding the 
standard of the constitutional review of the self determination of sexual intercourse, 
22) Song Ki-Chun and Lee Jung-Won, supra note 9, p.363.
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yet since the specifics of the evaluation is directly relevant to the individual’s 
essentially protected freedom, in case that it is decided to limit this freedom, the 
legislator is to prove the causal relationship, applying at the same time a strict 
scrutiny of proportionality. It is to note that different standards have been applied 
when reviewing the constitutionality of the adultery act and the crime of sexual 
intercourse under the pretense of marriage and thus the former was decided 
constitutional whereas as the latter unconstitutional. 
  Third, even if a strict proportional judgment were said to be applied regarding 
the self determination of sexual intercourse relevant to the adultery act, this does 
not immediately result to the unconstitutionality of the relevant act. This is because 
although adultery act and the crime of sexual intercourse under the pretense of 
marriage do share a common right of the self determination of sexual intercourse, 
the legislative purposes, elements and effects are clearly different from one 
another.23) In case of adultery, the unconstitutionality of the act have not been 
proven persuasive and thus ruled constitutional. However, in light of the changing 
legal reality concerning the self determination of sexual intercourse, it is most 
appropriate to abolish the adultery act. 
  Fourth, even if the adultery act were to be abolished, and the crime of sexual 
intercourse under the pretense of marriage were to be invalidated, this would not 
mean that both acts are to be ethically nor legally permitted. Hence, even if these 
two acts were no longer considered as criminally punishable, one cannot be 
exempted from ethical or civic responsibilities. Thus a person who has been 
23) Such difference for the crime for adultery and the crime of sexual intercourse under 
pretence of marriage is also reflected in the constitutional decisions. Judge Joo Seon 
Hye ruled the crime for adultery constitutional during the 3rd case, but decided that 
the crime of sexual intercourse under pretence of marriage was unconstitutional during 
the 1st case. Judges Lee Kong Hyun and Min Hyeong Ki, during the 4th case 
relating to the crime for adultery, rendered a constitutional decision, but decided that 
the crime of sexual intercourse under pretence of marriage was unconstitutional during 
the 2nd case. On the other hand, Judge Kim Hee Ok, in the 4th case concerning the 
crime for adultery, rendered that the law was incompatibility with the Constitution but 
accepted the provisional application of the law. However, Judge Kim decided that the 
crime of sexual intercourse under pretence of marriage was unconstitutional during the 
2nd case.
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involved in adultery or the crime of sexual intercourse under the pretense of 
marriage would still be accountable for its civic responsibilities and such acts 
would be grounds for divorce, separation of property or alimony compensation.
